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The growing penetration of distributed energy resources is opening up opportunities for local energy
management (LEM) e the coordination of decentralized energy supply, storage, transport, conversion
and consumption within a given geographical area. Because European electricity market liberalization
concentrates competition at the wholesale level, local energy management at the distribution level is
likely to impose new roles and responsibilities on existing and/or new actors. This paper provides in-
sights into the appropriateness of organizational models for ﬂexibility management to guarantee retail
competition and feasibility for upscaling. By means of a new analytical framework three projects in the
Netherlands and one in Germany have been analysed. Both the local aggregator and dynamic pricing
projects present potentials for retail competition and feasibility of upscaling in Europe.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the European Commission, parallel attention is given to the
introduction of competition in the electricity sector and the
ambitious targets for sustainability. The process of electricity sector
liberalization was formally ﬁnalized in 2007, inciting competition
in the wholesale and retail electricity markets and the unbundling
of network activities. The retail competition markets in Europe are
largely based on an assumption of centrally managed electricity
systems, whereas wholesale markets are increasingly coordinated
or merged [1]. Starting in 2015, all interconnected European power
exchanges are coupled, which represents a large step towards the





ier Ltd. This is an open access articWith regard to sustainability, achieving the ambitious 2020 and
2030 European climate targets relies on both the market penetra-
tion of large- and small-scale renewables and the deployment of
energy efﬁciency measures [3]. The recently established Energy
Union strategy strongly supports a new market design that would
support the integration of higher shares of renewable energy and
foster energy efﬁciency measures contributing to demand moder-
ation [4]. Especially Germany can be recognized with favourable
policies for renewables with priority connection and priority grid
access for generation units that produce electricity from renewable
sources [5]. The supportive feed-in-tariffs in Germany have incen-
tivized the widespread installation of small solar panels in the
residential and commercial sector with in 2014, 38 GW capacity of
solar PV installed, with more than 60% located at low voltage levels
[6]. Other examples of rapidly developing residential solar PV
segments are found in Belgium, where 1 in 13 households has a PV
system, but also in for example Greece and the United Kingdom [6].
Further, Denmark in particular has seen an increased penetration of
decentralized combined heat and power (CHP) [7e9]. Previous
analysis showed that liberalized electricity markets hindered thele under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. The emphasis on electric ﬂexibility management in this work.
C. Eid et al. / Energy 114 (2016) 913e922914adoption of small CHP units in other places like the United Kingdom
(UK), due to the discrimination of the liberalized electricity market
towards smaller electricity generators [9]. For many CHP plants in
the UK it would only be beneﬁcial to sell electricity to a third party,
providing lower pricing schemes than the actual electricity markets
[8]. Differently, regulation in Denmark supported adoption of CHP
units by allowing aggregations of those units to bid in the Danish
electricitymarkets. Analysis showed the economic viability of using
electric ﬂexibility from CHP units for national balancing purposes
and therefore improving the overall integration of wind power in
the sector [7].
At the distribution grid level new challenges are arising due to
the penetration of electric vehicles (EVs), especially in Norway and
the Netherlands [10]. To respond to these changes in supply and
demand, system operators and suppliers have started to develop
new strategies for handling a more decentralized system. Among
the more radical solutions is local energy management (LEM) e the
coordination of decentralized energy supply, storage, transport,
conversion and consumption within a given (local) geographical
area. Combined with automated control and demand-side man-
agement strategies, local energy management, especially with the
use of local heating production, holds the promise to signiﬁcantly
increase the efﬁciency of energy use, reduce carbon emissions and
enhance energy independence [7,9,11]. Many of these beneﬁts have
already been realized in the context of numerous local energy
projects initiated worldwide [12,13].
As countries across Europe seek to effectively and efﬁciently
manage the large-scale integration of distributed energy resources,
it is important to consider the effect of actor roles and re-
sponsibilities for managing the electric ﬂexibility from resources
locally in the regulatory context of energy retail competition.
Different authors have expressed the difﬁculties associated with
the unbundling of network and market functionalities [14,15]. For
example, due to the fact that the DSO is a monopoly party, it is
generally not allowed to trade electric ﬂexibility with end-users.
Because the internal market policy process imposes constraints
on how the electricity system can be organized, there may be
conﬂicts between these ﬂexibility management approaches and
market regulation. The aim of this paper is to give insight into the
compatibility of the organizational structure for ﬂexibility man-
agement with the European electricity retail competition context.
This is done through analysis of different real-life LEM cases and
their organizational structures, comparing them to the traditional
organizational structures and possibilities for retail competition
and lastly discussing the aspect of scalability of those projects.
We analyse four cases e three Dutch and one German case e
drawing both on publicly available material such as [16e20] and
interviews with involved project partners and managers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes back-
ground information on organizational structures for ﬂexibility
management, together with the framework for ﬂexibility man-
agement used in this analysis. Section 3 describes the method used
to analyse the cases, and Section 4 presents the results of the
analysis. This is followed by a discussion and conclusions in Sec-
tions 5 and 6.
2. Background
2.1. Organizational structures and electricity market integration
The organization and coordination of energy transactions on
local electricity distribution level has been explored by numerous
scholars for different local energy management concepts. Some
analyses focus only on electricity and refer to the terms smart grids,
virtual power plants and microgrids [21e24]; and others includethermal and chemical energy carriers with multi-energy carrier
systems and refer to the terms energy hubs or smart energy sys-
tems [11,25]. As described in the introduction, in this paper we
deﬁne local energy management (LEM) as the coordination of
decentralized energy supply, storage, transport, conversion and con-
sumption within a given (local) geographical area.
This paper aims to present the possibilities for integration of
local energy systems into the traditional regulatory context of
Europe. Speciﬁcally, the focus here is on the aspect of electricity
management integration and therefore this paper leaves out the
integration of heat or gas supply due to the fact that deserves
analysis by itself see Fig. 1 for a conceptual presentation. In the
ﬁgure, the aspect of electric ﬂexibility is presented as central.
Electric ﬂexibility can be deﬁned as a power adjustment with a
speciﬁc size and direction, sustained at a given moment for a given
duration from a speciﬁc location within the network[26]. Due to the
fact that for reliability of supply a constant balance between supply
and demand is required, the role of electric ﬂexibility and the
management thereof is crucial. This ﬂexibility can be used for
multiple purposes, ranging from network congestion management,
supply portfolio optimization and renewable integration. In this
research, the aspect of ﬂexibility management is analysed from an
organizational perspective instead of a technical perspective only.
This organizational structure can provide insights in whether a
ﬂexibility management method is closely related to the traditional
organizational structures to manage ﬂexibility in the electricity
sector in Europe.
2.2. Framework for ﬂexibility management
When discussing organizational structures and their impacts on
the arrangements of (electricity) markets, the theory of institu-
tional economics is relevant. TheWilliamson framework represents
how economic transactions are embedded in layers of formal or-
ganization, governance and informal institutions [27]. Künneke
proposed a technical counterpart of this framework, which has
been further elaborated by other researchers [28,29]. This
comprehensive framework shows how technical and economic
transactions are embedded in their technical and economic envi-
ronment. For example, for economic transactions, the rules for
(spot) market design provide the possibilities for actors to bid in the
markets. Alternatively, from a technical perspective, operational
control mechanisms manage the way in which technical trans-
actions take place in real-time. Annex 1 presents the techno-
economic framework. For the analysis in this paper the frame-
work has been adapted to focus on the management of ﬂexibility in
electricity systems and provide insight into the most suited design
for the European context. The framework includes three layers, a
techno-institutional layer, an economic layer and an operational
layer. Flexibility management is deﬁned as the application of the
four ﬂexibility management variables; the division of responsibilities
(who) for speciﬁed management of ﬂexibility of appliances (what) by
speciﬁc means (how) and for speciﬁc time-dependent system purposes
(why), and two organizational variables, thenumber of actorsin-
volved and thenature of transactions. Fig. 2 presents the frame-
work used to analyse the LEM cases in this paper. The next
Fig. 2. Framework for ﬂexibility management in electricity systems.
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2.2.1. Responsibilities (who)
The actors who assume responsibility for the management of
ﬂexibility at the low voltage level include the DSO, retailer, aggre-
gator and/or other actors like the TSO. Depending on which actor
assumes this responsibility, and its current business model, the
ﬂexibility is used for the speciﬁc market activities in which this
actor is involved and/or the services that this actor provides. For
example, the transmission system operator (TSO) is the chief entity
responsible for ensuring balance between the electricity supply and
demand in the system. This is done through settlement of various
markets, i.e. ancillary service market and balancing markets [26]. In
those markets, large generators and industrial customers are
eligible to place offers for the provision of upward or downward
ﬂexibility. At the distribution network level, there are currently no
markets for such ﬂexibility (outside of pilot projects). Still, different
actors might have speciﬁc interests involved with the use of ﬂexi-
bility; the retailer could use ﬂexibility for portfolio optimization,
while the distribution service operator (DSO) could use ﬂexibility to
reduce congestions for example as it is done in Sweden [30]. The
level of engagement in activities for ﬂexibility management by
DSOs, however, remains dependent on the regulated remuneration
for the activation of ﬂexibility. In Europe, most DSOs are subject to
incentive regulation, which means that their expenses should
reduce with an efﬁciency factor each year. However, the procure-
ment of ﬂexibility through smart grid solutions can increase the
operational expenses in a manner which counteracts the tendency
of the DSO to embark on this route [31].
2.2.2. Appliances (what)
An actor can assume responsibility for managing the ﬂexibility
of a speciﬁc (set of) appliance(s). This could include speciﬁc, in-
home appliances like washing machines, electrical heaters or an
EV, solar PV units and CHP units. Differently, ﬂexibility could be
provided by the entire household consumption (for example withthe provision of a time-based tariff for the entire household con-
sumption). Each appliance has speciﬁc technical abilities providing
speciﬁc ﬂexibility services [26].
2.2.3. Signals (how)
There are different ways to activate ﬂexibility. The most com-
mon signals for ﬂexibility activation are direct control, semi-direct
control and indirect signals (also named price signals). Direct
control provides direct access from a central actor (like an aggre-
gator) to control the operation of contracted devices. Direct control
provides secure ﬂexibility within a speciﬁc time and location for
the procuring actor and provides ease to the end-user due to the
fact that the end-user does not have to manually activate its units.
Differently, semi-direct control refers to the ability of end-users to
predeﬁne time bands for which the devices are providing ﬂexibility,
and after which the operations of the devices are automatically
adjusted. Semi-direct control is often used for a price signal
(explained hereafter), in order to automate the activation of devices
at low-price time periods.
Differently, indirect signals refer to price-based signals. The
ﬂexibility obtained from those types of arrangements refers to
“changes in electric usage by end-use customers from normal
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of elec-
tricity over time” (DOE, 2006). There are multiple time-based
pricing options available ranging from real-time pricing (RTP),
critical-peak pricing (CPP), time-of-use pricing (TOU), and peak-
time rebates (PTR) [32]. The price options differentiate from each
other mostly based on the price variability that they represent in
time. Real-time prices change very frequently (from around every
15 min to hourly basis) while time-of-use prices can change on a
time basis of 4 h. Different from direct control, indirect control give
end-users the freedom to participate in the provision of ﬂexibility
services. Therefore those signals do not provide security on the
expected capacity of ﬂexibility.
2.2.4. Markets (why)
Markets provide the organizational environment for economic
trading. For ﬂexibility management, markets can exist for speciﬁc
timeframes before real-time (for example ancillary service and
balancing service markets) and also include the location de-
pendency of that speciﬁc market (for markets for congestion
management are organized from a multi-node perspective).
Flexibility management in the electricity system requires
different types of ﬂexibility services, deﬁned by different time-
frames before real-time (ancillary services are traded very close to
real-time versus capacity markets which are much longer from
real-time). Furthermore, beside the time-dependency, the elec-
tricity system also has a location dependent need for ﬂexibility in
case of network congestions. Therefore, balancing markets are
typically centrally organized while markets for congestion man-
agement are organized form a multi-node perspective of the sys-
tem. The organization of markets in which actors are allowed to
trade provides a ﬁnancial incentive for ﬂexibility management in
the system. The already existing markets for ﬂexibility are those
managed by the TSO and partly by the market operator.
2.2.5. Number of actors involved and nature of transactions
Beside the diverse ﬂexibility design variables presented here,
furthermore organizational variables are of interest, which are
related to theway inwhich themarket is organized. These variables
are the number of actors involved and the nature of their trans-
actions [33]. The nature of transactions can be horizontal, hybrid or
hierarchical. When a single actor is managing the ﬂexibility, it
naturally presents a hierarchical nature of transactions between
end-user and the central deciding actor. However, when two or
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the transactions can be horizontal or hybrid. With a horizontal
organization, all of the actors have equal inﬂuence on the man-
agement of ﬂexibility. With hybrid transactions, it can be the case
that the transactions are not entirely horizontally arranged but one
speciﬁc actor is appointed to manage the ﬂexibility on behalf of
other actors.3. Method
In this work, four cases are analysed. The results of this analysis
are summarized in Table 1 which is based on the framework pre-
sented earlier in this paper. For each case, the four ﬂexibility
management variables and the two organizational variables are
described. The information from these cases comes from publicly
available material and from interviews with the project managers
involved.
Together, the insights in the separate the ﬂexibilitymanagement
variables can provide an indication of how well the organizational
approach suits to the European regulatory context and the possi-
bilities for upscaling of this approach. The situation as it is currently
the case in most European countries is presented in the last column
of Table 1.
The degree to which the cases provide possibilities to adhere to
a retail competition context and allow for upscaling relates to: (1)
theway inwhichmultiple retailers can trade in such system, (2) the
roles that the traditional actors like the DSO take within the case,
and (3) the possibilities for upscaling. The possibilities for upscaling
are related to the nature of the transactions; the more hierarchical
the nature of transactions, the less complex it is to scale the
respective approach due to the fact that the transactions are
managed according to a singular method. Differently, generally the
more actors involved, the more competition a case includes (less
monopolistic) and therefore the better suited it may be to the retail
competition model in Europe.
Given that this work aims to show what type of organizational
structures are most suited to the European context, this paper fo-
cuses mainly on the speciﬁed variables and organizational aspects
for ﬂexibility management. Of course, within each case, there are
many more indicators that provide insight into the technical and
economic performance of the system. This includes, for example,
the cost of electricity within various time-scales for each case, the
power of the installations for each case and the mathematical
model underlying each approach. Even though this information is
interesting from a techno-economic view, it is not relevant to the
aim of this work in terms of assessing the suitability to the Euro-
pean context. Therefore the focus remains on the arrangement ofTable 1
Flexibility management variables used in this paper.1
Variables Options
Who is responsible? DSO, retailer, aggregator and/or other actor
What appliances are managed? E.g.: CHP, PV, EV, customer appliances and/o
consumption
How is ﬂexibility activated? Price incentives or direct control
Why is this ﬂexibility activated? Balancing, day-ahead, ancillary services
and/or for local market, etc.
Number of actors involved 1 or more
Nature of transactions Hierarchical, hybrid or horizontalﬂexibility management and the organizational structures involved.
4. Results
The following sections present the different organizational
models for ﬂexibility management. The names (e.g. Multi-Objective
Optimization and Dynamic Pricing) have been chosen to illuminate
the central ﬂexibility management concepts used in the examples.
The cases are summarized only brieﬂy in order to remain focused
on the most important aspects of the organizational structures for
ﬂexibility management. Please see the indicated references for
detailed information regarding each case.
4.1. Case 1: multi-objective optimization
Power Matching City (PMC) is a project located in Hoogkerk, a
city within the Netherlands. There are three actors involved for the
management of ﬂexibility: the consumer, the DSO and the retailer
(ﬂexibility variable who). The project includes 40 households with
installations of Solar PV, EVs, heat pumps, micro CHP and a Pow-
ermatcher device (ﬂexibility variable what). This Powermatcher
manages the operations of the appliances and interacts with the
local market, taking into account actor preferences. In this project,
direct control is applied for the heat pump and the micro CHP (i.e.
controlling electricity production). The operations of the washing
machine can be pre-deﬁned and therefore semi-direct control is
provided to those appliances (ﬂexibility variable how). All other
household consumption units are not controlled, nor is any price
incentive given for general consumption. Each of three involved
actors bids (in an automated manner) in the market via which a
non-monetary “balance price” is determined at each moment in
time (ﬂexibility variablewhy). This local market takes into account
the day-ahead spot market price, balancing market price, local
transformer loading and consumer preferences for electricity con-
sumption (see Fig. 3).
4.1.1. Nature of the transactions and number of actors involved
In this case, the retailer, DSO and consumer play an important
role in the transactions for ﬂexibility. The IT system acts as a real-
time trading platform for local transactions between the different
trading agents (DSO, retailer and consumer) which can bid within
the local market, providing a non-monetary market price. Conse-
quently, due to the fact that there is not a central actor making the
decisions, the nature of the transactions in this case is horizontal.
4.1.2. Comparison to base case
Firstly, the DSO, retailer and consumer take up different rolesBase case3: ﬂexibility management in electricity sectors in Europe)
At high voltage level: TSO
At low voltage level: no speciﬁc responsibility for ﬂex management
r At high voltage level: large generators and customers
At low voltage: none
At high voltage level: through direct control & price incentives
At low voltage: normally no ﬂexibility activated, sometimes if retailer/DSO
provides a (price) incentive[38]
Existing TSO markets: e.g. ancillary services, balancing market,
congestions markets etc.
At low voltage: no speciﬁc market available
Single buyer (TSO), many sellers of ﬂexibility
At low voltage: not speciﬁed due to absence of market
Horizontal
At low voltage: not speciﬁed due to absence of market
Fig. 3. Organization of ﬂexibility management in Multi-Objective Optimization project
“Power Matching City”.
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context. In the daily operations of the multi-objective optimization
project, the retailer, DSO and end-user have been permitted to
procure ﬂexibility for individual economic objectives locally.
However, in the current retail competition context in Europe,
markets are not located at the distribution level but only at the
transmission level. Traditionally the DSO, retailer and end-users do
not assume this role and do not have permission to trade ﬂexibility
at the local level.
Secondly, within PMC an issue exists for the coordination of
ﬂexibility between actors. In PMC, the different interests of the
actors regarding ﬂexibility management have been arbitrary
divided; all agents received a certain measure of ﬂexibility. Expe-
rience showed that at certain moments in time conﬂicts could arise
in the procurement of ﬂexibility. Often, for instance, one party
needs all available ﬂexibility but could only use its own part from
the resident, or two actors would need the ﬂexibility at the same
time. Therefore, in PMC, the energy supplier assumed the role of
decidingwhowill receivewhat type of ﬂexibility [17]. However, in a
retail competition context as in Europe, where end-users should be
able to choose their supplier, this case can even become more
complex due to the fact that coordination is required between
multiple retailers, the DSO and the consumer.4.1.3. Possibilities for upscaling
Therefore, in order to make this case possible within the retail
competition model in Europe, a readjustment is needed regarding3 A more comprehensive overview of the use of ﬂexibility in traditional markets
can be found in Ref. [26].the roles and responsibilities of actors together with a method for
the set-up of local markets, which allows for multiple retailers to be
integrated. Next to the deﬁnition of those two important steps,
furthermore a settling method is required to locally divide the
ﬂexibility between different agents when this is procured simul-
taneously, also referred to as the coordination problem [34].
Appointing an actor to take care of the distribution of ﬂexibility
could support this, however it should be taken into account that
this actor might be biased towards speciﬁc market objectives
(instead of efﬁcient network utilization) when involved in market
activities. Therefore an important aspect is the deﬁnition of fairness
[17] from a social perspective for an unbiased division of ﬂexibility
that supports overall objectives of the sector. Lastly, in order to
motivate the DSO to procure ﬂexibility, adjustments in the regu-
lated income of DSOs are required.4.2. Case 2: dynamic pricing
Within The Netherlands, the project “Your Energy Moment” is a
pilot within an apartment block and a group of semi-detached
houses in the city of Breda. Within this project, a time-dependent
2-h varying tariff (V/kWh) is presented to the consumer via an
in-home energy display (ﬂexibility variable how). This ﬁnal tariff
includes both a price component of the retailer and of the DSO
(ﬂexibility variable who). Each of the households owns a PV unit
and net-metering with the time dependent electricity tariff takes
place for remunerating the PV production. The retail tariff is based
on the price variation in the day-ahead market while the time-
dependent transport tariff is a peak-pricing scheme, which is
related to the daily network peak-hours [19] (ﬂexibility variable
why).
The time-dependent tariff stimulates customers to shift their
total household electricity consumption in time. However, to sup-
port this load shifting, the customers are equipped with a smart
appliance, that, if programmed by the consumer, will automatically
turn on the ‘wet appliances’, namely the washing machine, dish-
washer and tumble dryer (ﬂexibility variablewhat) at the cheapest
moments in time (see Fig. 4).Fig. 4. Organization of ﬂexibility management in Dynamic Pricing project “Your En-
ergy Moment”.
Fig. 5. Organization of ﬂexibility management the Local Aggregator project “Energy
Frontrunners” adapted from Ref. [18].
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In this case, the nature of the transactions in the market is
horizontal due to the fact that the DSO and retailer both have the
possibility to present their tariff to the end-user. However, if
compared to the multi-objective optimization case, this case rep-
resents a less horizontal market arrangement due to the one-
directional price signal provided to the end-user by the DSO and
retailer. The consumer is not involved in the bidding process but
merely exposed to this signal. Therefore in this project the nature of
the transactions is horizontal, but in a reduced form than in the
Multi-Objective Optimization case.
4.2.2. Comparison to base case
In the Netherlands and most other European countries, the DSO
is obligated to provide non-discriminatory third party access with
ﬂat pricing schemes. Traditional regulation could hamper the time
based pricing from the DSO due to market power risks, especially
when at some moments the distribution price is higher than the
retail electricity price. The price signal given by the DSO in this case
however might lead to discrimination in time and location
regarding the use of electricity. The regulation of DSO price set-
tlement is therefore an important conﬂict with the retail compe-
tition model for the DSO.
4.2.3. Possibilities for upscaling
An important adjustment ﬁrstly is the allowance of the DSO to
provide time-based tariffs, and the provision of regulatory in-
centives for DSOs to do so. If the DSO is not being remunerated to
reduce investment expenses by slightly increasing operational
costs for the procurement of ﬂexibility, the DSO will remain unin-
terested in development towards price-based ﬂexibility activation.
Secondly, guidelines are required for the price signals given by
the retailer and DSO, which will then be forwarded to the consumer
through a settled formula. In order to ﬁt within the retail compe-
tition context, multiple retailers should be able to provide their
speciﬁc price signal, which then is combined with the local distri-
bution price. The possibilities for upscaling in this case are less
difﬁcult than in the Multi-Objective Optimization case, due to the
fact that only the price signal is the activator of ﬂexibility, and not a
simultaneous bidding process between multiple actors, as with the
PMC case.
4.3. Case 3: local aggregator
The Local Aggregator is a case referring to the project “Energy
Frontrunners” (Energie Koplopers in Dutch) in the municipality
Heerhugowaard, in the Netherlands.1 The applied ﬂexibility man-
agement method is described as Universal Smart Energy Frame-
work (USEF).2 In this project 240 households have a device installed
that is remotely controlled by which direct control is applied on
appliances (ﬂexibility variable how) by the local aggregator (ﬂexi-
bility variable who). In this project, the aggregator is the Dutch
retailer Essent. Essent controls the operation of the heat pumps,
electric boilers, fuel cells and PV curtailment (ﬂexibility variable
what). Besides being the aggregator, Essent is also the balance
responsible party (BRP), in charge of trading ﬂexibility on the na-
tional balancing markets (why). However, in this pilot project, the
trading transactions are simulated and do not take place in reality.
The DSO buys ﬂexibility from the aggregator in order to reduce
the solar peak from the PV panels and reduce the evening peak
consumption in the local distribution network. Eventually, at the1 See for more information https://www.energiekoplopers.nl/contact/.
2 See for more information: www.usef.info.end of the month, the (simulated) revenue that has been created
from trading activities in the balancing market and from the
network optimization is divided among the participating house-
holds (see Fig. 5).
4.3.1. Nature of transactions and number of actors involved
The aggregator assumes a central role in this case, and trades on
behalf of the balance responsible party and the DSO. Due to this
central role of the aggregator, the nature of the transactions can be
seen as a hybrid due to the fact that a single actor is responsible for
operations but takes into account the requests of the DSO and BRP.
4.3.2. Comparison to base case
In the pilot project, all the households had the freedom to
choose their own retailer, independent of whether this retailer was
the one responsible for aggregation and balance responsibility.
However, in a retail competition environment, it would not be
beneﬁcial for retailers that have supply contracts with customers
when an independent aggregator is able to make changes in their
supply programs to the end-users [35,36]. This would reduce their
revenues due to the penalties that need to be paid when unex-
pected changes in overall end-user consumption take place.
Secondly, next to the issue of balance responsibility, further-
more also in this case the role of the DSO is different from that in
the traditional liberalized model in Europe. As described in the
previous cases, the DSO as natural monopoly is generally not
incentivized nor allowed to procure ﬂexibility.
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Due to the monopoly role of the aggregator, ﬁrstly a clear deﬁ-
nition of its role and degree of freedom with regard to the man-
agement of ﬂexibility is required. For this aggregator, which could
be a regulated party, it should be clearly deﬁned what transactions
are allowed with the DSO and BRP while safeguarding customer
desires with the direct control of appliances.
Secondly, an important adjustment here is the allowance and
incentives for the DSO to procure ﬂexibility. If the DSO is not being
remunerated to reduce investment expenses of the grid by slightly
increasing operational costs for the procurement of ﬂexibility, the
DSO will remain uninterested in the development towards price-
based activation of ﬂexibility.
Lastly, in order enable the possibility to have retail choice for
customers, speciﬁc compensation mechanisms should be set up for
retailers affected by adjustments in their customers' consumption
by the independent aggregator.4.4. Case 4: local integrated utility
The village of Feldheim (Germany) represents an example of a
co-operation between private households, the municipality and
project developers for the management of a decentralized renew-
able energy system [20]. This system is managed by a cooperative,
which is both the retailer, the owner of the electricity network and
the manager of ﬂexibility (ﬂexibility variable who). The project
includes 37 households, two businesses, two local government
entities as well as three agricultural enterprises. The cooperative
uses direct control (variable how) to activate ﬂexibility from a
lithium-ion battery storage, biomass plant, wind power plant and
solar PV farm (variable what). Net production from the PV, wind
and biomass is sold back to the grid and is remunerated via a feed-
in tariff. The ﬂexibility from the battery storage is being sold for the
provision of ﬂexibility services for frequency control and the
operation of the devices are controlled in order to abide to network
constraints [20] (ﬂexibility variable why) (see Fig. 6).Fig. 6. Organization ﬂexibility management the Local Integrated Utility project
“Feldheim”.4.4.1. Nature of transactions and number of actors involved
The cooperative as a singlemonopolistic actor takes all decisions
regarding the operation of devices locally. Consequently, the nature
of the transactions that take place in the Feldheim project take a
hierarchical form. There is no involvement of a DSO or retailer due
to the fact that the cooperative is the owner of the local network
and responsible for the reliability of supply.
4.4.2. Comparison to base case
The locally owned and operated electricity system presented in
the integrated utility could be seen as conﬂicting with liberalization
rules due to the fact that network operator is not unbundled from
the electricity supply. Local customers in theory are then not
eligible to choose their supplier. However, due to the fact that the
local customers are mostly also shareholders in the cooperative,
this retail choice does not affect their interest for another retailer.
However, some customers still decided to choose another retailer
administratively (probably due to the fact that they are not part of
the cooperative) while the cooperative is still responsible for
ensuring overall reliability of electricity supply.
A risk of this development is that if all customers choose to be
administratively contracted with another supplier than the local
cooperative, this would lead to cost recovery problems for the local
supplier and eventually reduced reliability of supply. The end-users
however, in this project are shareholders within the cooperative,
which acts as an incentive for contracting with the local coopera-
tive. In long term, if many cooperatives emerged (without local
shareholders) there is a risk that all users are willing to contract
only with the cheapest retailer available in the country.
4.4.3. Possibilities for upscaling
This project inherently does not provide possibilities for retail
choice, due to the fact that the Local Integrated Utility is both
network owner and supplier of retail services. This goes against the
regulation for unbundling of network operations (the monopolistic
activities) from supply activities in the retail competition context.
In the retail competition context it is assumed that retail choice will
foster efﬁciency in the sector. In the case of a Local Integrated Utility
with local shareholders, however, the drive for efﬁciency results
directly from the community both owning the cooperation and
being end-users of its services. This case therefore inherently pro-
vides an alternative to the retail competition through self-
regulation.
5. Discussion
The presented cases show a range of different approaches to
ﬂexibility management in LEM projects. The results are summa-
rized in Table 2. The next sections summarize the ﬁndings and
conclude on the most suitable approach for scalability in the Eu-
ropean context.
5.1. The possibilities for retail choice
An important beneﬁt of the retail competition model is that
customers have the freedom to choose their retailer. The different
cases feature different levels of complexity to ensure retail choice
for customers. The easiest method to provide retail choice is the
Local Aggregator model (case 3), due to the fact that household
electricity consumption is not controlled by the aggregator, but
only speciﬁc appliances. When the aggregator changes the con-
sumption levels of end-users with diverse retailers, a compensation
mechanism is required to make up for the changes in the balancing
responsibility program.
Differently, the dynamic pricing and multi-objective
Table 2
Overview of ﬂexibility management and organizational structures in the LEM case studies.
Case Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Multi-objective optimization Dynamic pricing Local Aggregator Local integrated utility
Project name Power Matching City Your Energy Moment Energy Frontrunners Feldheim
Who is responsible for
ﬂexibility management?
DSO, retailer and customer
preference
DSO and retailer Aggregator Co-operative
What is managed? PV panels, electric vehicles,
heat pumps, washing
machines, micro CHP
PV panels, smart washing
machines and heat pumps
PV panels, heat pump
operation, electric boiler and
fuel cell
Wind, solar PV, battery, and
biomass plant
How are the appliances
managed?
Direct control Dynamic pricing Direct control Direct control
Why (for what purpose is
ﬂexibility used)
Reduction of network peaks
& supply optimization in
time-steps of 5 min




Reduction network peaks &
balancing services in time-
steps of 5 min
Reduction network peaks &
frequency control in time-
steps of 15 min
Number of actors involved 3 2 1 1
Nature of transactions Horizontal Horizontal Hybrid Hierarchical
Fig. 7. Conceptual presentation of cases and nature of transactions.
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due to the fact that the retailers and DSOs are actively involved (in
an automated manner) with the management of ﬂexibility. In those
projects, guidelines are required to make sure that multiple re-
tailers are allowed to access a part of the ﬂexibility of the end-users
by means of direct control (Case 1) or present their individual
(standardized) pricing schemes to the customer (case 2).
With the Local Integrated Utility case, the cooperation is both
owner of the local network and retailer of electricity. End-users in
this case are customers of this local retailer and shareholders in the
local cooperation. In order to make sure a similar project would
adhere to the requirements for retail competition, it might be a risk
that some end-users will chose to become customers of other re-
tailers instead of the local one, if the local electricity price is higher.
This risk could be avoided by making sure (just as in the Feldheim
case) that a speciﬁc amount of end-users are contracted locally and
others are free to choose. However, this does not fully constitute
retail competition.5.2. Possibilities for upscaling in Europe
The number of actors involved in the management of ﬂexibility
ranges between one and three in the different cases. In the Multi-
Objective Optimization project the transactions between the DSO,
retailer and consumer were of horizontal nature. Due to the fact
that the transactions between those actors take place in real-time,
the Multi-Objective Optimization represents a project with the
highest level of operational efﬁciency, however also the highest
complexity and related transaction costs, especially when inte-
grating diverse retailers within this project [37]. In the Dynamic
Pricing project, both the DSO and Retailer are involved with ﬂexi-
bility management by means of a time-based price signal. This
represents horizontal nature of transactions, but in a lower scale
than that of the Multi-Objective-Optimization due to the fact that
the consumer is not involved in determining but merely exposed to
a price signal. In the Local Aggregator project, a single actor is
responsible on behalf of the DSO and balance responsible party,
representing a hybrid nature of transactions. Lastly in the Inte-
grated Utility Model one central actor is responsible for ﬂexibility
management, representing a very hierarchical nature of trans-
actions. Fig. 7 represents the cases conceptually and the nature of
the transactions between the different actors.
In order to discuss the scale at which the cases would ﬁt within
the European retail competition context and thus provides possi-
bilities for upscaling, two points are of interest. First, to what de-
gree are multiple retailers able to offer their electricity to end-userssimultaneously? And secondly, what is the degree of complexity
involved with upscaling this methodology for further development
in Europe?
All cases except for the Integrated Utility theoretically provide
the possibility for retail competition. However, the more horizontal
the nature of the transactions and the number of actors involved,
the more technically complex the system becomes for retail
competition. This is mostly the case for the Multi-Objective Opti-
mization approach inwhich an iterative process of demand bidding
is used for the management of ﬂexibility. Such an algorithm for an
iterative grid capacity market may solve congestion in an
economically efﬁcient way, but its implementation requires
frequent exchange of information between the DSO agent, retailer
agents and consumer agent, increasing the required complexity
and transaction costs for this speciﬁc approach to adhere to retail
competition.
The dynamic pricing model provides a simpler method for
multiple retailers to compete for ﬂexibility by formalizing the
computation of the ﬁnal dynamic tariff to the end-user, before real-
time. Therefore this is a less complex method than the Multi-
Objective Optimization approach and probably more feasible for
upscaling.
The aggregator model is another approach suitable for upscal-
ing. Due to the fact that transactions are managed by a single
aggregator that is operating on behalf of the DSO and BRP, the
integration of multiple-retailers is simple due to the fact that end-
users can choose any supplier. However, principles need to be set
for the compensation between the BRP and retailers for the im-
balances that have been created by the aggregator. Furthermore, in
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activities (and the other way around), the aggregator should be a
regulated party or this activity could be fulﬁlled by an actor that is
already regulated, e.g. the DSO.
The needs for ﬂexibility provision and management have
everything to do with the purpose for which this is used in the
system. In the presented projects, trading of ﬂexibility has been
used to manage network peaks (in all projects), to align with the
day-ahead market price variations (in the Dynamic Pricing Model
and Technical Optimization Model) and to trade ﬂexibility in
balancing markets (Local Aggregator and Integrated Utility Model).
When trading of ﬂexibility takes place within already existing
markets, the involved traders receive monetary value for the ﬂexi-
bilityprocured.However, in traditional retail competitionmarketsno
market model exists for trading of distribution network capacity.
Therefore, as discussed earlier in the paper, such type of trading
cannot be made monetary at this moment without adjusted regu-
lations and market design, especially for the DSO within cases 1e3.
Currently, there is no rationale for DSOs in Europe to procure ﬂexi-
bility due to the method by which most DSOs are remunerated.
Incentive based regulations,which are currentlymostwidely used in
Europe, motivate DSOs to reduce operational expenses (OPEX) and/
or capital expenses (CAPEX) in line with an efﬁciency factor. Gener-
ally, the costs related toﬂexibility tradingwould be consideredOPEX
on which efﬁciency measures apply. Therefore, it would not be
beneﬁcial foraDSOtoprocureﬂexibilitysince thiswould increase the
operational expenses. By allowing the costs related to the procure-
ment of ﬂexibility (CAPEX and OPEX) to remain outside the regula-
tory benchmark, policy makers could support the DSO to utilize
ﬂexibility of end-users. An important issue with ﬂexibility manage-
ment for DSOs is that due to their monopoly position within their
geographic area of service, the price of ﬂexible demand cannot be
competitively set. Therefore, such trading, without sufﬁcient pricing
transparency, might lead to excessively high beneﬁts for the DSO.
To conclude, due to the feasibility of those projects and possi-
bilities to include retail competition, the Local Aggregator and the
Dynamic Pricing projects would be most suited for upscaling in the
European context.
Beside the organizational structures presented in this work, also
other organizational structures could be designed including aspects
from different cases. An example is a Local Aggregator utilizing an
ex-ante deﬁned time-based price from the retailer after which the
aggregator takes into account DSO requests for direct control at
moments of network congestions. This approach decreases the
need for frequent compensation mechanisms between a BRP and
the retailers but still provides incentives for efﬁcient use of ﬂexi-
bility taking into account network limits.
6. Conclusions
This paper presented an analysis of four organizational models
for ﬂexibility management. We study these models using cases
from the Netherlands and Germany. The case studies have been
categorized as Multi-Objective Optimization, Dynamic Pricing, Local
Aggregator and Local Integrated Utility. The analysis utilized four
ﬂexibility management variables (who, what, how and why), and
two organizational variables (the number of actors involved and the
nature of transactions).
The different approaches impose new roles on traditional actors,
especially on the distribution service operator (DSO) and the
retailer. Traditionally, in the retail competition model, the activities
of the DSO are limited to ensure a level playing ﬁeld for all market
participants. According to the DSO's current investment rationale,
which is based on incentive based schemes, DSOs would not be
incentivized to increase operational expenses in order to procureﬂexibility. Therefore to change the DSO's investment rationale from
mainly that of upgrading network capacity towards one in which
the DSO focuses on the efﬁcient use of network capacity through
ﬂexibility management requires that the regulated income of the
DSOs include the increased operational expenses for procurement
of ﬂexibility.
The cases show that the nature of transactions for ﬂexibility
management can vary frommore horizontal arrangements to more
hierarchical arrangements (with a local coordinating actor like a
utility or aggregator). Horizontal arrangements are inherentlymore
complex. On the other hand hierarchical structures provide greater
feasibility for upscaling and also the possibility to incorporate
multiple retailers, given that the central actor is not a Local Inte-
grated Utility. Our analysis shows that the Dynamic Pricing and
Local Aggregator approaches would be better suited to the retail
competition context in Europe. The issue that remains is the aspect
of ﬁnancial compensation between retailers and the balance
responsible party (as shown in the Local Aggregator case). Besides
the organizational structures presented in this work, other ap-
proaches for organizational structures could also be designed. An
example is a combination of the Local Aggregator and Dynamic
Pricing approach inwhich each retailer provides an ex-ante deﬁned
time-based price for electricity after which a Local Aggregator or
the DSO itself takes responsibility for ﬂexibility management to
avoid network congestions.
This work provides insight into the impact of organizational
structures on the roles of the actors and on the feasibility of large-
scale deployment of these arrangements in the European regula-
tory context. Both the local aggregator and dynamic pricing pro-
jects present potentials for retail competition and feasibility of
upscaling in Europe due to the fact that multiple retailers can be
integrated in a relatively simpliﬁed way. With the dynamic pricing
model multiple retailers compete for ﬂexibility by formalizing the
computation for the ﬁnal dynamic tariff to the end-user, before
real-time. With the aggregator model, the transactions are
managed by a single aggregator that is operating on behalf of the
DSO and BRP. The integration of multiple-retailers is simple due to
the fact that end-users can choose any supplier. However, princi-
ples need to be set for the compensation between the BRP and
retailers for the imbalances that have been created by the aggre-
gator. Furthermore, in order to make sure that market activities do
not overtake network activities (and the other way around), the
aggregator should be a regulated party or this role could be fulﬁlled
by an actor that is already regulated, such as the DSO.
An important next step is to quantify the costs of activating local
ﬂexibility for diverse organizational approaches. A comparison
between activating ﬂexibility locally versus centrally in the system
alongwith analyses of the impact of appointing the DSO as a central
coordinating actor for ﬂexibility management according to metrics
of transaction costs and economic efﬁciency would provide inter-
esting insights. Lastly, the authors recommend that future work
should be conducted on the economic viability of various socio-
institutional and technical alternatives for self-regulation in local
energy systems.
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